

Written submission to the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation

On behalf of the International Association for Community Development

Globalisation, migration, and social development

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Preamble

The IACD is an international membership organisation and is the international body advocating the approach of community development to transnational organisations such as the UN, WHO, FAO, UNICEF and ILO. The IACD is managed by an Executive of 20 members which has reserved places for the 7 regions of the world, to ensure its representativeness. The current Vice-Presidents are M. Jean-Marie Minkolou, Head of Community Development, Republic of the Cameroon and Ms Ranjit Kaur, of the National Community-Based Rehabilitation Coordinating Committee of Malaysia. Other executive members come from Australia, New Zealand/Aoteroa, China, Malaysia, Egypt, Kenya, USA, Hungary, Canada, Fiji, Scotland, Pakistan, India, Israel and Belgium.

The IACD has been active since 1952 in supporting the goals of community development on a worldwide basis and, in doing so, in promoting the aims of the United Nations. In 1999, the IACD was relaunched at a major international conference in Scotland. In recent years, for example;

- we have attended and participated in preparing a paper on participation at a UN consultative workshop in London (1997)
- we have been part of ILO consultations, including the preparatory conference for WSSD+5 at Geneva (1999) where we were one of the few NGOs permitted to speak by the then-President;
- made submissions to and attended the World Summit on Social Development Recall Conference in Geneva (2000), where we co-organised a workshop on social and community development;
- sent members to the World Congress Against Racism in Durban (2001); and
- responded to ECOSOC consultations such as the *Report on the World Social Situation*.

Discussions are advanced for a study tour/workshop in Cuba in 2003 and previous major conferences have been on 'Environmental Crisis and Sustainable Development' (Thailand 1993), 'Democracy and Development' (Belgium 1995), 'Conflict Management and Peace Construction' (South Africa 1997), 'Democratic Renewal and Citizen Action' (Scotland 1999), and on 'Protecting the environment, rebuilding local communities' (New Zealand 2001). The worldwide interest in community development is reflected in the broad global spread of those in membership of IACD, covering 79 countries. Many of these have national associations of community development and we are supporting the growth of others through events and conferences, or sending Board members to key meetings or events. For example, we are organising a conference in East and Central Europe in 2003 with the collaboration of associations in Bulgaria, Rumania and Czech Republic; and the President recently attended and spoke at conferences in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, at Kampala, Uganda and at Cleveland, Mississippi, USA, to support the development of regional networks of community development organisations and/or community development more generally. Our next major international conference will be in Yaounde, Cameroon, in 2005, with the support of the Cameroon Government.

The IACD is primarily concerned with issues such as social justice, social protection, empowerment, solidarity and the position of the disadvantaged. These are all issues which are central to the values of community development. Our comments here are based centrally on the nature of community development, its significant potential for the empowerment of the poor and disadvantaged, and the threat posed to the poor by globalisation and by the actions of global organisations.

The 'trickle-down' theory of development, which underpins structural adjustment programmes, is increasingly discredited in all countries where it has been practiced for years and where it has, in reality, led to a huge widening of the gap between rich and poor. In this context, we believe the role of community development workers can be critical. They can be used - perhaps manipulated might be a better term - to help the poor adjust peacefully to the management of disruptive and divisive economic change, or, more properly in our view, they can help the poor and less powerful to give voice to their own concerns and needs. Community development workers can clearly assert the basic principles of community development, that it is about working with the needs and aspirations of groups of disadvantaged people in poor localities, to articulate and organise around those needs, and to place them at the front rather than at the end of political debate. It can confront the threats posed by destructive nationalism and racism, as it has done in the instances of Northern Ireland, of South Africa, and even of Yugoslavia, by building bridges based on the values of common humanity, between communities whose political leaders have placed them at war. And it can build links across national boundaries between campaigns and groups in differing states to analyse and respond to growing global threats to humanity such as sex tourism, the depredation of the natural environment and the use of child labour.

The community development agenda focuses on the poorest and most marginal and seeks to bring them the benefits of social, economic and political progress. It speaks and acts on the values of social justice, solidarity, citizenship and classlessness which are threatened by free market economic restructuring and by the dismantling of the safety nets of public welfare, by the fragmentation, insecurity and competition of the so-called post-modernist world.

We were pleased to be able to participate in the ILO Consultation on the Follow-up on World Summit for Social Development, November, 1999 and to offer some comments from the NGO perspective on the ILO report. At that time, we raised the issue of NGO representation. We do not wish to compromise the roles of the three major social partners on which the work of the ILO is based. Nevertheless, the issue of social development is one which is central to the work of NGOs, as organisations working with the poor and disadvantaged. We believe our perspective is important to the deliberations of organisations such as the ILO and would appreciate a more structured input to its work. For example, in future consultations, it would be helpful to have the opportunity to meet together as employers, employees and government representatives do, to be able to put forward consensual views from our group. We are pleased to have the opportunity to contribute to the work of the Commission.

The IACD's concern with social justice reflects values concerned with

- ◆ achieving fairness, and equality of outcomes (not just equality of opportunity) and treatment;
- ◆ recognising the dignity and equal worth and encouraging the self-esteem of all;
- ◆ the meeting of basic needs (needs which are, of course, often culturally specific);

- ◆ reducing inequalities in wealth, income and life chances;
- ◆ recognising the importance of difference and diversity; and
- ◆ the participation of all, including the most disadvantaged.

What this definition does, as well as focus on issues of the maldistribution of income and wealth – issues salient everywhere in the world - is to highlight the role of those most disadvantaged by social injustice, as actors - rather than simply victims - in the search for social justice. The United Nations points to the many ways, including organizational, informational and developmental ways, as well as the more familiar means, such as constitutional and legal, political and economic ways, in which participation by the disadvantaged themselves may promote social justice. Our own additional emphasis would be on the role of community or social development as the means by which the excluded and the marginalised can act on their own behalves in this search and to recognise both the gender and the cultural dimensions of social injustice. These are key dimensions when reflecting on issues of migration and racism.

Globalisation and migration

So, after these preliminary contextualising remarks, to our main discussion. Globalisation is a term commonly associated with an increasingly dominant process of economic change, the process whereby economic transactions take place regardless of national boundaries or sovereignty. Many in the developed world argue that globalisation represents the construction of a liberal world economic order and brings with it demonstrable benefits in the form not only of free market economies but also liberal forms of representative democracy (Venters 2002). We believe there are profound difficulties with this analysis. Nation states which espouse the cause of globalisation are in reality less enthusiastic about some of its impacts, increasingly finding that their ability to exercise political and economic control within their boundaries is compromised by 'footloose' economic actors. These actors move, as they have done for a century or more, capital to labour, free from national controls and increasingly also now require international migration of labour to capital. From their point of view, migration of labour to sources of employment is a good. Globalisation means, however, that the consequences of economic decisions are felt ever more quickly by increasing numbers of those who do not take the decisions and who indeed may be many thousands of miles from where the decisions are taken. (The movement of capital to labour, more typical of the behaviour of private corporations, is now incidentally being extended to public services: one recent example which came our attention was the use of a data processing company in Madras, India to clear the backlog of applications to a new UK agency established to vet the backgrounds of people working with vulnerable children and adults. A more typical example is the loss of 800 jobs in a major UK insurance company – the Prudential – which has also recently shifted its operations to India).

The economic benefits of globalisation thus appear, from this analysis and in other ways, to be unevenly distributed. Hirst and Thompson (1999), for example, argue that the global economy hardly touches many parts of the world – except perhaps in being used as a source of cheap labour – and that enhanced capital flows are largely limited to exchanges between the 22 or so OECD countries. Globalisation is in reality opening up new opportunities for growth largely for the biggest economic players which are increasingly coming to dominate economic activity and free from political

accountability. The list of the world's 100 largest economies now includes 50 giant corporations, none of them controlled indigenously within Africa, and the five largest companies in the world have combined sales greater than the total incomes of the world's 46 poorest nations, the majority of which, of course, are African. Although this kind of economic power is usually concentrated within global Boardrooms, it can sometimes equally be exercised in the most obscene ways by individuals. For example, a few years ago, one young British financial speculator based in Singapore destroyed the livelihoods of thousands of families world-wide.

In extreme situations, this economic power – when threatened by local attempts at democratic control – is responded to by military coups implicitly or explicitly supported by western governments, such as in Venezuela, Chile, Guatemala, Nicaragua or perhaps, in the next few weeks, in Brazil, or at least by economic destabilisation. The point about corporate globalization, as Milton Friedman once commented, is that such corporations cannot be ethical, their only responsibility is to make profits. The top 200 corporations' sales levels are almost 20 times the combined annual income of the world's 1.2 Bn poorest people – they account for over one quarter of the world's economic activity yet employ less than 1% of its workforce. These corporations are also steadily eroding the influence of the UN by ensuring that it has no ability to regulate their activities in the name of peace and social justice.

This growing and unaccountable power base is one driver of the critique mounted by those arguing for 'globalisation from below', against the work of the World Trade Organisation and transnational bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank which have imposed neo-liberal economic structural change programmes upon developing countries in order to open up their markets to exploitation by the so-called 'developed' world. But whilst the agenda of the West, and its major global actors, appears to be to make all economic markets equally available to all nation states, the reality is that the West (or the North, depending on your terminology) wants to open up the markets of the South to its own products whilst maintaining economic barriers and tariffs to protect its own markets from penetration by the products of Southern countries. The reality is also, as French (1996) comments on Jamaica and other countries, that 'structural adjustment and liberalisation have wreaked havoc in so many communities' whilst, for example, agricultural subsidies – currently at the rate of £1M every two minutes, that's about £100M during the course of this lecture – prop up the rich farmers of the West. These subsidies and these western tariffs mean that most of the value of Uganda's rich resource base – coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, cotton, cobalt etc. – are not returned to the people of poor countries.

The impacts of structural adjustment – the programmes driven through by the west after the debt crisis of the 1980s - have been profound, most of all on the poorest in poor countries. For example, Oxfam reports that over half employment in Latin America is now casualized compared with only 10% ten years ago. In SubSaharan Africa, the proportion of those living below the official UN poverty line – of about a USdollar a day- is now two-fifths of the entire population, or about 220Million people, and this proportion is increasing. Levels of inequality within African countries are also generally increasing, hardly a ringing endorsement of the impact of the neo-liberal agenda of the past fifteen years. As Opio (2000) and Okidi and Mugambe (2002) have all suggested from local research in Uganda, for example, although most headline economic indicators show an impressive performance over the past

decades, this masks widening social and economic divisions, with the government's Poverty Eradication Action Plan, linked to the model of trickle-down development, failing to halt widening gaps in income and wealth. Uganda's northern region in particular and rural areas generally are suffering from heightened relative poverty, poor literacy and health indicators, and a failure to address the gender imbalance. This picture is repeated in many poor (and indeed, not so poor) countries where economic liberalisation has occurred. Opio also argues the need for bottom-up community participation in poverty reduction programmes to halt these trends. The major global economic actors also hold poorer commodity producing countries in thrall through the mechanism of debt; for example 90% of Brazil's export earnings now go to service its external debt burden. The picture is not that much different in Uganda although we are pleased to note that, under pressure from organisations such as Jubilee 2000, the current UK government has taken some steps to cancel third world debt.

So much for economic globalisation. In relation to the development of *political* ideas and structures, globalisation has also been seen, not least in Fukuyama's 'end of history thesis', as the triumph of liberal democracy over alternative forms of political ideology, and socialism and fascism in particular. This political 'triumph' is increasingly expressed through transnational structures of governance ranging from the United Nations and its associated bodies, through to the growing number of international organisations concerned with the administration of human rights and justice.

However, this is also a flawed analysis and to paraphrase Mark Twain, rumours of the death of competing political ideologies are premature. Venters (*op. cit.*: 8) argues persuasively that whilst in Europe and elsewhere, 'new political forms have arisen to address the inadequacies of the state as a problem-solving instrument ... [to] ... catch up with debordering economic processes' ... 'in parts of the developing world, deregulation and insertion into the world economy has produced division, conflict and collective violence', particularly in the context of weak states and weak civil society. In the context of Africa, the example we have used above, that of Uganda, would not be regarded as a weak state but it is not free from the political and economic pressures that we are describing. The divisions alluded to by Venters, often generated or accentuated by post-colonial settlements, have then often developed a racialised momentum of their own, as in Rwanda, the Congo, Northern Uganda and Southern Sudan, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone and, further afield, in Iraq and Afghanistan. The collapse of some of these so-called 'weak states' and the growth of inter-ethnic violence has in turn led to an acceleration of the processes of inter-state migration which are now troubling the political elites of many western countries and have encouraged, paradoxically, a growth in fascist and neo-fascist political movements. Globalisation has, as the UN itself observes (NGLS 2002), directly 'contributed to migration [and the accompanying phenomenon of growing racism] by weakening the ability of developing countries to generate employment for most of their population, to invest in basic infrastructure and support their own industry, and to allocate resources for health, education and social security'. Migration is also, of course, a direct response to racism within the national sphere.

Globalisation thus brings with it a number of clear threats: first amongst these of course is the tendency to ideological hegemony. This works at a number of levels and we want to point to two of these. One is at the level of language, what I refer to

in discussing the role of community or social development as 'the confusion of community'. The term 'community', and indeed 'community development' is now yet again being sprayed in an undifferentiated way onto programmes, initiatives and interventions on a world-wide basis. This is apparent in the UK where the political right argues for the rolling back of the state, and greater freedom for the family and the community and the political left uses the language of empowerment as the route to individual freedom; both link community to freedom but mean very different things. In the centre – between left and right - are many who regard the attraction of Etzioni's communitarianism as 'a middle way [or in the language of the British Prime Minister, the Third Way] forward from both the failures of the free market and overpatronizing welfare bureaucracies.' One could use other examples of the corruption of language, for example the use of the word development itself which might more properly be replaced in the context of many African countries with words such as dedevelopment, underdevelopment or misdevelopment.

Yet all – both left and right, local and national politicians - use the language of community in support of their political projects and this language, of empowerment and participation, has now found its way into the agendas of many transnational agencies, including the most powerful agencies concerned with managing the world's economy and with social development. A recent United Nations Human Development Report commented, for example, that, in the face of current challenges for development, 'people's participation is becoming the central issue of our time'. The World Bank, better known for its fiscal conservatism than for its political and social risk-taking, has argued that community participation can be a means for ensuring that Third World Development Projects reach the poorest in the most efficient and cost-effective way. Our anxiety is that the language of community is frequently used as a cloak to cover other political agendas, and that many of these agencies in reality give little attention to issues of social justice, with respecting the dignity and humanity of the poorest, with their right to participate in decisions which affect them, with mutuality and equality, all principles which, in our view, underpin the philosophy and practice of community development. In the UK, as elsewhere, the almost revivalist use of the language of community in official programmes for the poor tends to obscure the fact that these programme in reality offer little or no prospect of the poor taking more political or economic control over their own futures.

In the face of this confusion about the meaning of the term community, most insidiously used by the West to promote its own worldview under the cloak of the notion of the 'international community', we might do well to remember the words of the Chipko people of Northern India. They, like many of the grassroots environmental NGOs and social development groups assembled in Johannesburg for the Earth Summit two months ago, are clear that the major economic and political struggles of the future will increasingly be about the sensitive use of limited natural resources. In countries such as the Congo, where 400 illegal logging concessions have been granted and 20% of the forest may be lost in the next 15 years, this is hardly news. The Chipko movement is concerned with preserving the natural regeneration of forests in opposition to the desire of multinational logging companies which want to exploit timber resources and move on, an experience repeated in Indonesia and in the equatorial rainforests of Africa and Latin America. Years of experience have bred in the Chipko a healthy scepticism of the claims made by social development projects run by so-called experts who claim to bring lasting benefits to the poor. The Chipko argue, in line with true community development principles, that the local people are the most competent managers of the resources that sustain

them, an approach which multinational companies and outside experts often regard as heretical and certainly threatening to their notion of the 'natural economic order'. These outside experts have too frequently of course themselves become the precursors of structural adjustment programmes, social and economic division and the loss of local control over the wealth represented by natural resources.

The Chipko tell that there is a story in the villages about a fox that comes wearing a tiger's coat to terrify the people. When the real tiger comes, however, it wears a fox's coat. The Chipko argue that 'we should beware of those who come saying they love the people', and should treat their claims with this same degree of scepticism. Let us remember that it was companies such as Exxon Mobil – with its strong links with the Bush family - which urged President Bush of the USA (where 5% of the world's population are responsible for 30% of the world's environmental damage) - not to attend the World Earth Summit and thus to undermine the search for a sustainable environmental global agreement – not much talk of the international community there! Despite some initiatives by a few companies, these same oil companies can hardly claim to be friends of the poor and dispossessed with their records of polluting the maritime and terrestrial environments across the world : the crab beds of Nigeria's Ogoni Delta for example are now too poisonous by petroleum toxins to eat. In Colombia, BP has received the biggest fine in its history for oil rig pollution following years of illegal deforestation, water contamination and the dumping of untreated toxic waste. Fortunately, there are more hopeful examples, including, again, in Uganda, such as the partnership for water and sanitation, where the expertise of technologically developed countries has supported local knowledge and enthusiasm in helping local people acquire the skills to deliver sufficient sustainable supplies of clean drinking water. The danger is of course, and reflecting gross global disparities in economic power, that, at summits like the Earth Summit, as the UK International Development Secretary recently commented, those countries – such as the USA and most of Western Europe - which have plundered and polluted the planet will now pull the ladder of growth up behind them, and impose rules which limit the ability of poor countries to pursue any kind of sustainable economic growth.

The second and related threat of globalisation, which we touched on earlier, is at the level of economic theory and practice. The globalisation of economic power has brought with it unprecedented opportunities for the dominance of local economic development in allegedly independent states by the free market model. Market-oriented economic change has brought with it, in reality, not the freedom for local people to control local economies but the possibility that local economic change becomes less and less under the control of local or even national interests, and is concentrated in the hands of those for whom local community interests are of no interest whatsoever. The so-called 'banana war' between the USA and the EU, which have been arguing over the heads of local labourers and which will cause significant job losses on both sides of the Atlantic, and there are many other examples of the way in which local commodities such as coffee and sugar have been manipulated in the interests, not of local producers, but of global economic actors. Coffee is another good example of the kind of unprocessed commodity for which Africa is well-known – these commodities account for 70% of all African exports, despite the recent slump in world prices. Yet the added value which produces the high prices people pay in European shops is generated by processing within manufacturing plants in Europe, where western companies take the profits, leaving the local producers still poor.

Structural adjustment, often supported by military or market economic intervention, has in reality undermined the sustainability of local communities world-wide with profound effects for the poor of many countries, who, in the case of women in particular, have often been driven to petty trading, migration, and sexual exploitation. No country is free from these impacts but the most vulnerable countries and the poorest people within them suffer the most. Recently, for example, stories have emerged of African and Asian women being delivered into what is effectively sexual slavery in Britain and other west European countries. In Russia, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet empire - which collapse was again described by some as the final triumph of the values of competitive capitalism - the emergence of uncontrolled market values has in reality led to soaring unemployment, a huge rise in poverty, and in Moscow becoming a crime and Mafia-controlled illegal economic world centre. Women can be seen on the streets attempting to sell their entire possessions in return for enough cash to buy food. In Britain itself, the consequence of 18 years of free market 'virtues' under the governments of Margaret Thatcher, was enormous social and economic division, a tripling of those in poverty, the return of diseases such as rickets and tuberculosis which we thought had been defeated many years ago, and increasing numbers of older people dying of hypothermia because they could not afford to heat their homes adequately as well as eat.

The 'trickle-down' theory of development, which underpins these structural adjustment programmes, as we have argued, is now thoroughly discredited by those who understand or experience its impacts although clearly it is not in the interests of those who benefit from it to say so. However, *The Financial Times*, a well-respected but hardly left of centre UK financial newspaper, recently noted that the implementation of free market approaches to development in the developed world had actually led to 'trickle up' for the bottom income quartile of their populations, that is that the poorest had got poorer and the richest got richer. That picture is repeated - often in an exaggerated form - throughout the so-called developing countries both in terms of material resources but also in terms of access to basic needs. The gap is widening not only in terms of income and wealth but essentials such as water. Forty percent of the world's population lives now without adequate water supplies; on present day trends, and notwithstanding the rhetoric of development aid of rich countries, that proportion may grow to 67% in the next twenty years.

'Trickle-down' is essentially the theory that says if you give enough to the rich, some will reach the poor, or as it was once memorably described by Professor JK Galbraith: 'if you feed enough oats to the horses - or perhaps buffaloes I should say in the present context - some will pass down the road to the sparrows'. This theory is indeed discredited and not solely in the eyes of the sparrows. Trickle-down in Britain has, in reality, led to a huge widening of the gap between rich and poor, and to both social and economic division, a picture which is again repeated across the world. For example, in New Zealand, which most enthusiastically embraced the liberal market experiment of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the consequences in the late 1980s and early 1990s were soaring unemployment, a dismantling of the welfare state and in due course, the highest suicide rate within OECD countries. This story is repeated, albeit in differing contexts in countries of the South; in Nigeria, for example, the consequence of structural adjustment was that for the first time since independence, parents had to pay fees for their children to attend primary school. In South Africa, structural adjustment is steadily destroying the value of what was the strongest currency in the whole continent. This is why,

we would argue, the approach of social or community development is critical because, in contrast to trickle-down processes, it is concerned with bottom-up development which privileges the perspectives, needs and solutions of ordinary people.

The unevenness of the process of globalisation, and of the distribution of its benefits, is thus promoting obvious paradoxes, tensions and conflicts. We don't have space here to do more than touch on one of these and this is the issue of migration and the concomitant growth in racism worldwide. Here we shall be particularly focusing on the experience of European states, but we suspect the messages of this analysis are equally appropriate to many countries across the world, particularly because of the inter-relationship between economic and social change and between different regions of the world. We also want briefly to ask in concluding this discussion, what the role of community development should be – at local, national and transnational levels - in confronting this phenomenon. We are not, incidentally, suggesting, that racism has emerged simply as a response to the growth of international migration and to the vastly increased numbers of refugees and asylum seekers arriving in Western Europe, mainly from Africa and from Central and East Europe and Asia: despite legislation, often the outcome of the struggles of minority groups over the past, racism has remained a feature of western societies. Contemporary forms of migration – often driven by economic processes - have, however, now provided a new focus which right wing, chauvinistic and fascist organisations have exploited to deliver a more timeless racist message and the response of states, as we shall discuss in more detail below, has been at best ambivalent.

So soon after the first anniversary of the attack on the World Trade Centre, we want to observe also in passing that the, at times, rather muddled messages of the so-called 'global campaign against terrorism' brought into being by the September 11th bombings, messages which have occasionally appeared close to being Islamophobic, have had a direct effect within many European countries as the anger and violence of some host nationals has been turned against anyone appearing to resemble an Al-Qaida terrorist, even, most tragically, against Afghani refugees who had themselves fled from the Taliban regime. Such refugees have been attacked and, in some cases, murdered in countries as far apart as the UK and Russia. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia has recently reported that Muslims throughout Europe have suffered more hostility and physical attacks since September 11 within a climate of hostility often generated by 'sensationalist and vitriolic media campaigns' (see eg *The Times*, 16 April 2002). Ironically, what appears at times to be a western campaign against Islamic fundamentalism is led by many close to an equally oppressive form of fundamentalism, evangelical Christianity.

Our hope is that one major alternative impact of the 'war against terrorism' specifically and globalisation more generally will be, however, that those living in rich states should no longer fail to be able to see the interconnectedness of debates about poverty and social justice in First and Third World countries; we may all reject the form of the attacks on the twin towers but one associated message – of anger against rich nations for their role in further impoverishing poor nations – cannot be wished away. As Jordan (2002:120) argues when considering the ways in which national governments hold down taxes to guard against the flight of mobile capital, 'there are still more losers than winners in the world from the impact of these forms of global capitalism. And by making the national politics of social justice more difficult – disempowering organised labour, socialist parties and collective action by

the disadvantaged – these economic forces were also making spaces and opportunities for other [and more unpleasant] kinds of action and critique’.

The dimensions of social justice we alluded to earlier, including respect for diversity and difference, in my mind also core values of community development, have now been given a sharper profile as a result of terrorist and inter-ethnic violence but perhaps most of all because of the rapid growth in migration between countries. The 33rd Session of the UN Commission on Population and Development, held in New York in March 2000, heard from the Director of the UN Population Division that ‘international migration’ would become the major demographic issue of the 21st century (NGLS, 2000), leading to changes in language, religion, ethnicity and nationality and to what he rather circumspectly described as ‘negative public sentiment and xenophobia.’ Alternatively, and more positively for community development workers, he suggested it might lead to innovation, revitalisation and tolerance. Other delegates to that conference noted the strong gender dimension of international migration, particularly in relation to women being drawn into the sex industry. Although women are about half of all migrants, they are typically found in more exploited situations; more than 60% of Sri Lankan migrants, for example, are women employed as domestic workers with poor pay and no security and there is increasing evidence, as we mentioned earlier, of young girls from countries such as Nigeria being brought to England allegedly as refugees but in reality as commodities to be bought and sold within the sex trade in Western Europe.

Quite apart from the many millions of those who are moving within the global marketplace across national boundaries in a not unreasonable search for better living conditions – or in some cases forced by dispossession of their livelihoods as a result of climate change or the destruction of their own local economies - there are currently upwards of 25M people worldwide displaced by war or violence within their own countries. Half of these are refugees. Most of these migrants are particularly affected by racism in some form or another. There are more than 150 Million international migrants, representing approximately 3% of the world’s population, a figure which is growing at about 2.5% per year. Many millions more are affected by individual and structural racism within their own societies, even where that has not taken the extreme form of war or inter-ethnic violence.

A brief historical account of racism

Our account of racism necessarily is based largely on a historical and contemporary reading of the British experience, and, to a lesser extent, that of Europe, although I have witnessed and analysed it elsewhere in the world. Racism – often in alliance with cultural and religious imperialism – has indeed driven much of the conflict and exploitation which has characterised our world for hundreds of years. In addition to inter-ethnic conflict, in part a legacy of imperial exploitation and division, which has led to hundreds of thousands dead in Uganda, in Rwanda, Sudan, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Congo, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Algeria – the African list is almost endless - Indonesia, in most countries of the Balkans and much of South East and Central Asia. Racism in some countries, as in South Africa before 1994, has been given a constitutional basis. In Fiji, the Indian community is increasingly obstructed from holding political or economic power as it was for a time in Uganda and much of the violence in Zimbabwe at present is driven by a racialised momentum. It is of course hardly surprising that racism is such a powerful force in post-colonial societies

since it was racism which was used to justify both European – British, Dutch, Spanish, Belgian, Portuguese, French, Danish, Italian and German - domination of their colonies and its specific economic manifestations such as slavery, and which manipulated local divisions to ensure control of local economies.

Although the phenomenon of racism is growing worldwide, the issues of 'race' and migration, and of both individual and state-sponsored racist responses, are of course hardly new ones within the domestic landscape of the UK or other 'developed' countries. Eight hundred years ago, for example, the entire Jewish population of York in England, was burned to death by a mob incited by local landowners who wished to avoid repaying their large debts. Two hundred years later, to paraphrase Fryer (1984), 'ethnocentric myths about dark-skinned people from over the sea eased European consciences about enslaving Africans', thus encouraging the slave trade on which the economic fortunes of many European and American millionaires are still based. This approach to those of presumed inferiority was adopted by all the major imperial powers and few voices dissented; voices such as that of Bartholome de Las Casa, the first Bishop of Chiapas in Mexico who told the Spanish Emperor Charles V, in the light of the mass murder of Mexican Indians by the conquistadores that 'no people should be forced to submit to another people on the grounds of a presumed cultural inferiority', nor that Christianity could be propagated by the sword and gun – as it had been by the Crusaders and was subsequently to be done in many other parts of the world. The Emperor Charles' response was to withdraw his support from the Bishop.

The hostility of imperial powers towards those of different skin colour extended to its behaviour to those it colonised during its age of imperialism and the consequences of this for native or aboriginal populations are still profound. For example, the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 ceded governance of Aotearoa (New Zealand) to the British Crown but offered some form of protection to the Maori in terms of continuing possession of and authority over their lands and property, and gave the Maori the 'rights and privileges of British subjects'. The legal basis of the Treaty is now disputed but it was introduced, in any case, in the expectation, as had been also the case in Australia, that those Maori (as with Australian Kuri or native American Indians) who had survived the wars carried out on behalf of those wishing to seize land in these countries, would die out as a result of imported European diseases such as influenza or, at best, become incorporated into the new western culture.

The same picture applies in Australia where the Aboriginal Kuri, having initially been regarded as not existing at all under the imperial doctrine of Terra Nullius, and despite, again, some gains such as the establishment of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Council, still do not have anything like the benefits of full citizenship of Australia. This is a common situation facing all First Nations people, such as the San in Botswana (who are dominated politically and economically by the main black Setswana ethnic group which appears to want to drive the San out of existence), Aboriginal Indians in Canada (where, unlike in Australia, the First Nations people have at least been offered a statement of reconciliation by the federal government), or the First Nations people of Hawaii and the Pacific Islands nations, whose case has yet properly to be heard in other parts of the world. Despite some advances in their status over the past two hundred years, First Nations minorities are still disproportionately represented amongst those who are unemployed, living on low incomes, in prison, with poor education and health outcomes and amongst those dying prematurely. Although aboriginal people have generally had their civil rights

and, eventually, their political rights protected, they have yet to achieve full social citizenship. This is one arena where community or social development may have an important role to play.

Everyday contemporary racism

But what happens to those from developing countries, facing economic collapse, who migrate abroad in search of better work and life opportunities? Within the so-called developed countries of the West, racism towards residents and migrants alike is an everyday experience. It is not possible to review this experience of racism in the relatively short space available here. Within the UK, for example, we have recently concluded that every aspect of Britain's welfare state, for long held to be one its most progressive political and social achievements, is characterised by racism at both institutional and individual levels (Craig 2000). A recent opinion poll found that roughly one-third of the UK population were prepared to admit that they had racist attitudes. There have been at least 24 racially-motivated murders in Britain since 1991, most of them simply individual acts of violence on minority ethnic community members across the whole of the UK.

Recent research (eg Modood *et al.* 1997; Craig 1999) also demonstrates that it is amongst the poorest that one is most likely to find Britain's minorities. Britain's minority ethnic population, now about 7% of the total population, is dominated by those originating from countries which were formerly colonies of Britain and, as in other EU countries, is concentrated in major urban centres. Minority ethnic groups are more likely, in some cases (particularly Pakistani, Bangladeshi, African-Caribbean and the growing new refugee communities), very much more likely, to be in poverty and on the margins of society, than the population at large (Craig 1999; Rahman *et al.* 2000; Britton *et al.* 2002). It is the continued deprivation of many of Britain's minority populations, their failure to access welfare or the labour market on anything like equal terms, together with the failure of their own elders to provide effective leadership which, it is argued, has provoked the increasingly frequent disturbances in Britain's cities over the past few years (Manawar 2003). One response has been the disturbances; another is for young black and Asian community workers to build new forms of leadership.

This experience is not limited to the UK. My analysis of the experience of minorities entering the labour market across ten European countries, from Sweden to Hungary, shows similar patterns, shaped by the same structural response of racism which drives many aspects of European national policy-making (Craig 2002). This racism is experienced both by immigrant minorities and, as we noted earlier, by the longer-standing resident native, or 'First Nations' ethnic minorities such as the Saami of Northern Scandinavia, the Roma of East and Central Europe, and the Basque of Northern Spain and Southern France.

A recent European review lists, for example, the ways in which racism specifically affects the opportunities of minority or migrant groups in the labour market:

- migrants frequently suffer from having the least training, the least appropriate skills and as a result are seriously over-represented in unemployment statistics throughout the EU;

- immigrants and refugees may be blamed if they do find work ('they have taken a job from a local person'), or blamed if they do not work ('living off the welfare benefit system');
- much of the available work for minorities is with poor pay, includes shift work, part-time and temporary work without protection and security;
- minorities, refugees and travellers may find work, but in illegal or particularly arduous conditions, or in the informal ... economy;
- where there is a problem of illegality within the work-force and among minorities and migrants, local populations within Europe blame the illegal or migrant workers for bringing down wages and creating unemployment among the host population;
- the position of minority groups is also often made more precarious by their lack of language skills and knowledge of local welfare arrangements (i.e. a lack of social and cultural capital), which impacts on health, social security, education and housing prospects. (*Ibid.*)

However, racism has taken a new form in recent years. The whole of Europe is now gripped in an intense political debate about refugee and asylum policy which itself reflects longer-standing structural racism. Economic recession across the EU during the last ten years has led to growing calls for controls on immigration and for repatriation of existing 'foreigners', lending support to xenophobic campaigns in populist media and, as noted earlier, to increasing levels of racist violence against religious, ethnic and cultural minorities in countries as different in their culture and history of immigration as the UK, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Hungary and Germany. Europe is attempting to become, in a commonly-accepted term, 'Fortress Europe', although expansion of the EU to the east will make this problematic. A recent article (Elliott 2002) suggests that Europe is attempting to become the first 'gated' continent, making the parallel with the recently-dismantled Iron Curtain which once separated west from east.

Although immigration has been part of nation-building in countries such as Australia and New Zealand, (as it was for a short while in postwar European countries such as Germany and Italy which are now hostile to further immigration), it is already clear from the response of the Australian government to the Afghani and other boat people travelling from Indonesia that this Fortress mentality is increasingly being adopted in economically more prosperous countries in other world regions. The European political response has in general been one more explicitly driven by racism than for many years, particularly by the growth of asylum-seeking throughout Europe, where more than 1/3 Million people are now seeking leave to remain. Many European countries and indeed others further afield, as for example Hanson's party in Australia, are witnessing the growth of explicitly racist and chauvinistic parties. In the recent French Presidential elections, the party of the Far Right succeeded in reaching the second stage of the ballot, driving the candidate of the left out of office in doing so; in the Netherlands, the party of a maverick right-wing candidate with pronouncedly hostile views on immigration, advocating the repatriation of Muslim residents, achieved the second largest number of seats despite – or perhaps partly because of – his assassination shortly before the general election; and Germany's Chancellor Schroder has warned against a similar possibility ahead of the recent German elections, whilst former Chancellor Schmidt – moving further to the right line with many political leaders in Europe - has argued that Germans want no more immigration.

Racism is thus emerging as a formal national and transnational political response to migration, giving apparently legitimacy to an increased level of racist violence, for example, to arson attacks, murder and violence in Germany, the Netherlands and Britain. Racist political organisation, supported by the internet, now has a transnational character; for example, fascists of UK nationality were implicated in arson attacks in Germany and the net is used substantially by football followers promoting racist views. Even countries traditionally viewed as liberal and tolerant now witness the growth of influential racist political movements; one such example is the semi-fascist Danish People's Party, with popularity ratings as high as 15%, which also argues for repatriation of immigrants. It is now part of a centre-right coalition government which has imposed highly restrictive immigration controls. European countries as far afield as Norway, Austria, Portugal, Italy and Belgium all have governments similarly dependent on the support of far right racist parties.

The growth of racist violence of course makes the social and economic position of migrants even more precarious, adding to their political marginalisation, not least because many of even the most long-standing minority groups tend to occupy jobs within the service sector which make them more physically exposed. For example, in what is regarded as another of the most progressive democratic regimes in the world, Sweden, the rate of unemployment amongst non-Nordic residents doubled in the 1990s to 61% (Craig 2002) whereas in parts of Hungary and Rumania, the unemployment rates of local Roma population are substantially higher.

Many refugees and asylum seekers arrive at the shores of EU countries having been supported by exploitative and criminal gangs, travelling in appalling conditions in overcrowded and unsafe boats or in stifling lorries, for which privilege they pay huge sums of money either upfront, or by instalments once they have entered local labour markets. Some have paid literally with their lives such as those in one lorry which was opened at an English Port two years ago to reveal a cargo of 58 Chinese young men suffocated to death, or the 8 Turkish refugees who were found dead in the back of another container lorry opened last year in Southern Ireland, the African refugees reportedly thrown overboard by unscrupulous seafarers, or those represented by the crosses marking the line of graves on the Mexican side of its barbed wire border with the USA.

The political stance of governments to migrants is at best ambivalent but has been growing increasingly hostile. Most European countries have developed structures, policies and legislation over the past thirty years which, though often ineffective in practice, represent attempts to provide protection for minorities against discrimination. At the same time, calls for immigration control have steadily grown and the increased flow of refugees and migrants has sharpened these contradictions. The treatment of refugees and asylum seekers is increasingly harsh and racist, starting generally from the assumption that all asylum seekers are actually not fleeing from a well-founded fear of persecution but in reality are simply seeking a better economic standard of living. On the one hand, western governments are attempting to build barriers to trade in labour to their own advantage, in a way which mirrors their trade in goods, services and commodities. At the same time as global corporations are increasingly manipulating the local economies of poor countries and driving many to migrate in search of work, access to that work is increasingly being managed by rich countries in ways which ensure that migrants deliver their work with as little call on the resources of rich economies as possible. Those few migrants who achieve refugee status are provided with the poorest

housing and a subsistence income, below that of even the poorest settled minorities. This racist treatment of course is not meted out to white migrants from Commonwealth countries and returning UK citizens who actually form the largest single group of immigrants to the UK or to the *aussiedler*, those people deemed to be of German origin who, despite having lived in Poland or Russia for years, are treated as Germans when they decide to return to live in Germany whilst those of Turkish or Yugoslav origin who have lived within Germany for perhaps twenty years are regarded as non-citizens.

Within so-called 'developed' societies, racism now performs two functions: one, to allow people of different skin colour to be exploited economically; two, it creates the conditions for them to be used as political scapegoats, for example in relation to crime and drug-taking or more general economic decline; this picture is replicated in countries of the south which are characterised by racial and ethnic divisions. Many of the countries claiming to be multicultural, such as Britain, France and Germany are, as Favell (2002) argues, deeply polarised. Their huge disparities in income and wealth, often with a strongly racial dimension, directly resultant on their adoption of unregulated market forces, have impacted strongly on traditional white working class communities which have proved to be fertile recruiting grounds for the parties of the political far right.

Paradoxically, many European countries have followed others in awakening to the problem of labour shortages in specific areas of the economy. Some commentators are now arguing that Western European countries may need to *increase* immigration to cope with the effects of demographic change. The UN Population Division estimates that the population of the 15 EU countries and those bidding for membership would fall by about 15% to 628m in the next fifty years leaving a labour deficit in many areas of the labour market. The same tensions are apparent in the USA. In 1996, a powerful lobby within Congress both fought to cut benefit for immigrants but at the same time opposed tighter restrictions on immigration. As a result, the numbers of immigrants entering the USA that year, at over one million, was the highest for more than eighty years (Clarke and Fox Piven 2001); but they will be amongst the poorest of America's residents. Most of these migrants will again find places at the bottom of the labour market.

Similarly, within many rich countries of the Middle East, cheap imported labour – on a time-limited basis, from countries such as Pakistani, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Indonesia, has filled jobs in the low-paid service sector economy – nannying, chauffeuring, nursing, cleaning - for many years. Thus, at the same time as growing political hostility to them, the more general economic contribution of migrants to national economies is coming formally to be recognised. Yet for some of these migrants, the level of economic exploitation borders on slavery, the use of human labour as an economic commodity in a context of the simultaneous denial of human rights. We are witnessing in Western Europe the gradual emergence of what is effectively a new slave trade within the very different contemporary contexts of economic globalisation, and large-scale movement of refugees, represented most sharply perhaps again by the illegal trade in young women of East and Central European, African and South East Asian origins. This slavery is mirrored in other countries – in the experience of domestic workers employed in many countries with no security of abode, of child sex slaves in Thailand, Christian brick workers in Pakistan, bonded labourers in India (where one 12 year-old child leader of opposition

to the employing gangs was recently assassinated), the charcoal workers of Brazil and the black African slaves of Mauritania.

However, and ironically, although the place of past generations of migrants in the labour market has been in the worst – and often hidden - sectors of the economy, with unsocial conditions such as continuous night shifts, low pay, higher health risks and lack of security, the most worrying - to government – the gaps now appearing in the western labour markets, require those with highly marketable skills and experience, such as doctors, nurses, engineers and computer programmers. Within Uganda's health services, there is a shortage of, amongst other personnel, trained nurses and the answer to this problem lies in western Europe which is increasingly drawing trained personnel away from developing countries. Contradictions are thus beginning to appear in Europe's racist immigration and asylum policies as countries seek to open a small window of opportunity to these high status refugees, despite the fact that it makes a mockery of such countries' claims about the purely economic motives of the mass of refugees. It also runs counter to notions of sustainable development aid to the developing countries from which these migrants come and provides a parallel, in terms of the loss of labour market skills, to the economic disinvestment in poorer countries which increasingly characterises globalisation as a whole. In the many European countries which have been moving towards a high dependency ratio of non-economically active to economically active people, migrants are now also being looked to again as a source of cheap labour to provide caring services for the growing population of older people, a tendency which will add to the general marginalisation of minorities within the labour market.

Contradictorily too there is now growing formal awareness of the economic benefits that migration brings to local economies: in Britain, for example, it is becoming clear that the many migrants working, for example in the British construction industry from as far away as Russia and the Ukraine, are not depriving local people of jobs but are 'helping to combat severe labour shortages, easing inflationary pressures and helping to keep interest rates low for everybody with a mortgage or other form of debt.'

The response of community development

We want to conclude by saying something very briefly about how community development can play a role in confronting these processes on behalf of the poorest and most marginalised people. It has been argued elsewhere that globalisation already presents many challenges to those active in community development (Craig 1998) but the growth of racism is perhaps one of its greatest challenges, confronting the most basic values of community development. The conditions created by globalisation - of economic exploitation and division with concomitant political division – are precisely those under which racism thrives, placing the weakest economic actors, those growing numbers occupying low-paid insecure flexible labour markets (Castles and Davidson 2000), at greatest risk. This is therefore the political and economic context in which community development must have a role to play, to ensure the development of a socially just society which properly includes those who offer their labour to, and who seek to be full members of, our communities and upon whom increasingly the basic welfare structures and services of most countries now depend.

In countries like the UK, faced with an increase in racism at local level, community development workers have had agendas defined for them by this local racist victimisation and it is here that the most obvious and immediate responses of community development are being made. Building on local knowledge, networks and experience, they have also organised to combat the racist pronouncements of government. But what, at a broader and strategic level, including at the global level, should be the contribution of community development to confronting racism? And how can we turn the processes inherent in globalisation to the advantage of its victims?

Community or social development (Craig 1998), is both a practice, with a set of skills and techniques, and a broader philosophical approach to working with people, one which strives to give ordinary people a voice for expressing and acting on their needs and desires and, through the process of participating in this approach to social change, offering people, particularly the most powerless and deprived, support for their empowerment. It is a practice whose potential for positive and peaceful social change has been recognised worldwide (Craig and Mayo 1995). First of all, community development's response has to be one which promotes its value base; social development work should thus, for example, challenge the appearance of racism in whatever form it takes and support the development of local responses and solutions to social and economic problems. Social development now has also to work in the context of the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers, usually in fairly hostile environments, where there is competition for basic resources, where there has been frequently little history of previous migrant settlement and where little development work is done with local residents before substantial numbers of refugees arrive. It is work which, as with social development work in areas of ethnic conflict elsewhere, in areas of violence or inter-ethnic conflict or war, often places the community worker at personal risk as we have found in our own UK experience in Northern Ireland (Lovett *et al.* 1994; CDJ 1998).

Despite the forces ranged against it, the role of community or social development workers in the context of globalisation and the growing dominance of neo-liberal economic agendas can be critical. These people and their projects can be used - perhaps manipulated might be a better term - to help the poor adjust peacefully to the management of economic change, or they can - as they have done worldwide from Brazil to India, Mexico to Malaysia, help the poor and less powerful to give voice to their own concerns and needs. Community or social development workers can collude with those who use the terms community and community development without any real political commitment to their true meanings - they can pretend to 'love the people' in the words of the Chipko - or they can assert the basic principles of community development, that it is about working with the needs and aspirations of groups of disadvantaged people in poor localities, to articulate and organise around those needs, and to place them at the front rather than at the end of political debate. Social and community development can, in another example of the particular threat posed by globalisation about which I have been talking, align itself to the forces of destructive nationalism and racism or it can, as it has done in the instances of Northern Ireland, of South Africa, and even of Yugoslavia, build bridges based on the values of common humanity, between communities whose political leaders have placed them at war.

Community development can also contribute to sustainable development and there are many examples worldwide now of sustainable development built on a

combination of local control and outside technology appropriate to local contexts. For example, millions of third world farms, supported by social development expertise, are already using low-tech innovations to increase production (*THES*, 23.8.2002); in Kenya, farmers plant particular weeds in maize fields to divert the attention of pests. In Zimbabwe, a social development programme called Campfire gives local communities control over resources; in this programme, natural products such as crocodile eggs, timber, caterpillars, and goods and service such as tourist sites and facilities are exchanged for cash which has been used to dig wells and build schools. There are many opportunities for such development in Uganda using local resources and local skills.

Organising on the basis of the values of community and social development, however, will also increasingly need to be done at an international level because that is the level at which the economic processes operate which have done – and continue to do – so much damage to all of our countries. This is the level at which international organisations such as the International Association for Community Development can make a contribution alongside the growing number of international NGOs, in encouraging the development of global links between local activists around issues such as racism – links which were strongly developed for example during the United Nations World Congress Against Racism in Durban last year. One of the potential benefits of the global growth of electronic communication has been the ability to network effectively across national boundaries to create mass campaigns, although there are, as we noted earlier, many countries, particularly in parts of Africa and central Asia, which are still ‘information poor’. The oppositional events of Seattle, Prague, Davos, Quebec and Genoa; the work of the NGO forum organising around the World Social Development Summit Recall Conference in Geneva two years ago; the growing influence of the World Social Forum, shown at its recent huge meeting in Porto Alegre in Brazil, attended by 12,000 people from 120 countries; and the huge and disparate attendance at the anti-racism conference in Durban in September 2001, have all shown the potential ways in which electronic networking can be an organising tool, a tool which is increasingly exploited by social and community development workers to network, share information and build campaigns

This kind of action is one of the forms of global action referred to by Gaventa in his typology of ‘global citizen action’ (Edwards and Gaventa 2001). He argues that ‘through community organizations, social movements, issue campaigns and policy advocacy, citizens have found ways to have their voices heard and to influence the decisions and practices of larger institutions that affect their lives’ (277). His typology – based on the unfamiliar notion of ‘think locally, act globally’ – includes not only action on or against global institutions (which have had significant local and regional impacts), but transnational campaigns on issues of mutual concern, action to realize or promote rights offered by global treaties and agreements (such as freedom from debt, or freedom from domestic violence against women), and a generalised level of support for the right to participate in ‘decisionmaking in social, economic, cultural and political life, within and across the local, national and global arenas’ (*Ibid.*:278). Here is a huge agenda for community development workers, particularly in relation to ‘building from the bottom up’ or ‘globalisation from below’ and in helping local groups move from campaign slogans to constituencies for change linking local to regional to national and supranational arenas. Gaventa also argues that global citizen action ‘is strengthened by participatory forms of research, increasingly sophisticated policy analysis, and continuous organisational learning’, all processes to which community development can make a strong contribution (*Ibid.*: 282-3). In relation

specifically to issues around racism and migration, with their transnational agendas, community development workers can play a critical role in building links between communities both within and across national borders, through networking, research and basic organisational skills.

Two grounded examples of the ways in which international organisation can be done are provided by those who have been working in a social development context with the San bushmen of the Kalahari desert area. National boundaries have cut across the traditional lands of the San; a similar geopolitical historical reality has divided the Saami in Northern Scandinavia and the Roma of Eastern and Central Europe. The San's relatively small population is now spread across six southern African countries; they move predominantly within Botswana but also in South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe and Zambia. A small community development trust working in the heart of the Kalahari with the San has helped to create a single independent campaigning organisation which brings together representatives of the San across these national boundaries; this organisation is pressing all the governments of the region for better treatment for the San. This work is a useful reminder too that racism is not the preserve of white groups; many of the San groups are the victims of racist ideologies perpetrated by black-led governments. Similarly, representatives of the Roma from many European countries have been meeting in recent years to build a solidaristic and transnational campaign for their rights.

The other strategy being pursued by the San Kuru Community Development Trust is to draw together indigenous peoples from all over the world for consultations based on common themes of empowerment, culture and spirituality. The first such independent consultation, held in Botswana in 1998, brought together people from all the countries where the San are resident, as well as indigenous people from the USA, Canada, Kenya, Norway, Brazil and Australia. Future such events will hopefully draw on a wider range of groups including Maori groups who have a more advanced constitutional position than many aboriginal/First Nations minorities. These consultations looked at the importance of culturally-shaped income generating activities, the need for training, literacy and human resource development, and cultural programmes to counter marginalisation, support self-respect and promote indigenous arts and craft production. They also produced a manifesto in the form of a series of resolutions to do with fighting dependency, promoting solidarity and gender equality, as well as the significance of traditional customs and spiritual beliefs, and the protection of traditional territories, that is a claim for universal human rights allied to specific cultural rights. Although these developments have been stimulated in part by community development workers, they are now largely run by indigenous people themselves; there remains, however, a strong role for community development world-wide to facilitate more and stronger links between these First Nation and minority ethnic national groups.

Another example of international action, building on the techniques of community development, and responding to some of the worst outcomes of globalisation, is the growth of campaigns around issues such as child or female sexual trade between countries, or in opposition to tourism to areas such as Myanmar where there are oppressive regimes. In both these instances, local campaigning groups in countries from both the North and the South, using community organisation skills, have linked and/or responded to calls from specific third world countries to build global campaigns of opposition. These campaigns may be directed towards legislative ends, to provide a framework, which can be used as a lever against discriminatory policies

and practices. For example, growing awareness, promoted by the work of local community-based organisations, of racism and discrimination within many EU member states, has led to the European Union recently agreeing a Directive which enforces the principle of equal treatment, based on Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty of June 1997. This encourages 'appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation' and requires most member states to rewrite their legislation by the end of 2002. The UN itself, consequent on community-based lobbies emerging from the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, has now moved to establish an anti-discrimination unit within the UNHCHR machinery, specifically to address the growth of racism.

Racism has long been a global phenomenon; but economic globalisation – with its drivers for migration - is now facilitating the growth of new and dangerous forms of racism and ethnic division. These few examples suggest some ways in which community development can contribute both locally and globally to anti-racist work. Recent events and the wider globalising context of growing migration both within economic and refugee contexts suggests that the task of combating racism is likely to need to grow. However, as Noam Chomsky put it, anything can be reformed, even if it takes many years of international and local campaigning and struggle at many levels, as in the case of apartheid South Africa, or brief moments of mass mobilisation, as in Serbia and the Philippines. In Chomsky's view, popular mood and popular action can make a significant difference in how institutions, structures and policies are reformed. The task of those concerned with the values of social justice and social development, in our personal and professional practice, is to help to create the conditions for both mood and action, at whatever level and in whatever forums we work. We believe it is an increasingly urgent task.

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